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The considerations which I propose bringing forward in this
paper are of such a nature that any conclusions derived from them
must take the form, not so much of definite propositions as of a
rather large and indefinite problem. Two conceptions-ethics
and the lawv-which embody different, but intimately related,
forces and types of human development are to be compared, and
something attempted by way of estimating their interdependence.
The problem consists in determining what is likely to be the
precise application to the law of our own land, in the near or
more distant future, of the principles which render it dependent
for its development upon the development of the moral conscious-
ness of the people of the land. Thus, the title of the paper,
which suggests the constant interaction of social forces between
the law and ethics, between legality and morality, both furnishes
a theme for historical and philosophical treatment, and also ex-
cites the spirit of prophecy.
It would doubtless contribute to brevity and precision if we
could give at once a concise and universally accepted definition
to the conceptions covered by the words, ethics and -the law.
But, as is the case with all the greater interests of man in his
historical development, this ideal of perfect definition is not easily
attained. As a layman in the law, I am willing to accept any one
of several somewhat variant conceptions. Let us say, then. with
Mr. Justice Holmes,' that by the law we understand "a body of
reports, treatises, and statutes, in this country and in England,
extending back for 6oo years, and now increasing annually
by hundreds." Or, if this definition seems somewhat too deficient
in spirit, substantiality and life, because, in the words of Sir
Frederick Pollock, "Law is not an affair of bare literal precepts,
as the mechanical school would have it, but is the sense of
justice taking form in peoples and races." we will rather say that
"the law" is a comprehensive term for the collective rules of
conduct which are accepted and enforced by the sovereign author-
*Lecture delivered before the Yale Law School on March io, igog.
I See his lecture, The Path of the Law, in the Harvard Law Review,
X, p. 457.
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ity ;2 and with us this authority is lodged, either in the local gov-
ernment, or in that of the State, or of the nation at large. As to
the conception covered by the word "ethics," I will venture to
give my own definition : "Ethics is the science of human conduct
-its sources, its development, its sanctions, and its most general
principles-as related to a rational ideal." Or, to define more
strictly this science, in order to bring it into closer relations with
the science and practice of law, by ethics we mean the collective
sentiments, judgments, and approved practices of the body of
the people, with respect to what is deemed right and wrong in
conduct, as measured by a certain ideal standard of character-in
a word, the public conscience or moral consciousness.
The next consideration to notice is that both ethics and the
law, the public morality and the body of legal rules, at every
epoch in history, and in all lands, are of necessity subject to de-
velopment. All systems of law are this. But especially is our law,
with its accumulations of decisions and statutes enacted by legis-
lative bodies, and grafted upon the common law as derived from
England, and expanded and adapted in this country, one of the
most notable and complete examples of a true development which
the race affords. For nearly a thousand years there has been no
interruption, in the form of a revolution, no substantial break.
such as has several times occurred in the history of the devel-"
opment of Roman Law in Southern Europe, to the growth of
the law of England and the United States.
According to Sir Frederick Pollock, for six and a half cen-
turies in England there was no measure introduced so revolu-
tionary in character as was the introduction of code-pleading in
New York and other American states. But this does not pre-
vent the same authority from speaking of the law of both coun-
tries as "our law," the common law ;" or from insisting upon
the "organic unity of our legal institutions and science." In the
interests of this free and untrammelled, national-and may we not
say, racial ?-development, the English courts and English parlia-
ment repeatedly repulsed all interference from the canonical law
of the Roman Catholic Church. They also declined to lean upon
the Corpus Juris, even when quoting it, under the impression that
2 Comp. The Expansion of the Common La w, Sir Frederick Pollock,
Bart., D. C.-L. (Boston), 1904, p. 4.
3See the author's Philosophy of Conduct (Chas. Scrilviers' Sons),
p. 14.
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the Roman Law, as prevalent on the continent, was of a genius
somewhat foreign to the Anglo Saxon race. And nothing con-
nected with our own national policy and national prosperity has
been more jealously guarded against foreign influences, or revo-
lutionary attacks than this our development of statutes, reports,
and decisions, which constitute the law of the land.
That the public morality-the judgments, sentiments, and ap-
proved practices, respecting matters of the right and wrong of
conduct-is also a matter of development, is the complex result-
ant of changing psychological and historical forces, needs no
argument. I am one of those who hold that there are, indeed,
certain aspects or elements of morality which are universal and
abiding. The essential nature of the moral judgment, the charac-
ter of the feeling which motives the action, and the fundamental
forms of conduct corresponding to the type of a personal ideal,
do not change as do the practices of men under varying econom-
ical, social, and religious influences and conditions. But that
complex, for which we are entitled to use the confessedly vague
terms, the "public conscience," or, the "public morality," is un-
doubtedly subject to a continuous process of development. It is
ceaselessly changing in some of its manifestations; it is always
appreciating or depreciating in the scale that measures moral
values.
These two forms of human development can neyer be kept
apart. They can never avoid a ceaseless process of action and re-
action, of interdependence and interaction. The necessity for this is
bedded in the nature of man, in the nature of society, and in all
manner of social institutions-in the very nature of the -universe
itself. That the law constantly and profoundly influences the
public conscience, the moral sentiments and judgments, and all
the incidents and phases of conduct, is so patent to those who are
accustomed to take the highest point of view, that the state-
ment requires no proof and little illustration. Good laws, en-
forced justly and wisely, not only conserve, but also elevate the
public morality. Bad laws, whether broken or kept, degrade or
hinder the moral progress of the people. Confessedly all laws,
whether regarded as good or bad from the most advanced ethical
point of view, if treated with indifference by the people or habit-
ually broken without enforcement of penalty, debilitate and ener-
vate the public conscience. And some statutes there are which come
near to enforcing the most heinous and injurious breaches of the
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moral law. Such, for example, are tl-e laws at present regulating
the taxation of personal property in the State of Ohio, where, as
one of her own lawyers said to the writer: "You must either cheat
or be cheated, and the truly conscientious man often does not
know which he ought to do." But as regarded from the wider
outlook, and in the large historical way, we are justly proud of
the enormous educative force over the moral development of hun-
dreds of millions, which our law has had, and is still having, not
only in England and America, but also in India, and other remote
places of the world. Nor do we need to do more than refer to
the moral influence of the same legal system over the vast crowds
of foreigners that either come here to visit or remain to become
citizens.
It is the converse of this proposition, however, which interests
us more especially at the present time. The most ardent advocate
of the supereminent rationality of "our law" could not claim that
it is the "perfection of reason." Just because it is a hupman insti-
tution, which, like all things human, must undergo a ceaseless
process of change, that may be either improvement or deteriora-
tion, the law of the land is destined never to become perfectly
reasonable. Therefore, we may conclude these two truths-first,
a wide margin must be left for mistakes, imperfections, injustices,
even as in the sight of each generation; and, second, in order to ap-
proximate perfection, the law must change by adapting itself to
the changed conditions-economic, social and moral--of each
succeeding generation. Now all these changing conditions are,
in the wider but legitimate meaning of the term, also ethical;
that is, they determine the rules of the peolple's conduct in relation
to an ethical ideal.
This intimate dependence of the law upon the moral judgments,
sentiments, and conduct of the people whose law it is, we find to
be further evinced by the very discussion of the distinction be-
tween ethics and the law. Such a distinction is confessedly diffi-
cult. Writers on law and jurisprudence differ and argue about
the distinction. In his work on the Elenienis of Jurisprudence (p.
24), Holland confesses to embarrassment in the attempt to dis-
tinguish sharply the term law as it is used in jurisprudence from
the same term in the other practical sciences. All the so-called
"practical sciences," however, have the common characteristic
that, as the very word "practical" signifies, they fall witlin the
sphere of ethics, or the science of conduct. With the authority
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just cited: "Ethic is the science of the conformity of human
character to a type;" Nomology is the science of the conformity
of action to rules." Jurisprudence is a branch of nomology. It
requires only a superficial analysis to show that this definition
really blends rather than sharply distinguishes the spheres of
ethics and nomology.
The same view of ethics and the law is further confirmed
and illustrated by the language of the law, which is to an ex-
pressive extent taken from the vocabulary of the popular morals.
Words of this sort are such as "rights," "duties," "malice," "in-
tent," "negligence," etc. Especially is the prevalent use of the
idea attaching itself to the word "reasonable" in pleadings at law,
and in courts of justice, suggestive in this connection. For exam-
ple, every man must take reasonable care not even without
malice to injure another; and he has the right to assume that
the other will take reasonable care not to injure him. This is
ethical, and at the same time good law. For the possession of a
man's reason obligates the possessor to use the reason of a man.
Charges for public service must be reasonable; contracts must
have "reason" in them; a reasonable time must be allowed for
their fulfilment; and only compensatory or reasonable damages
can be allowed for injuries done by one to another. In the deter-
mination of what is reasonable, and, therefore, must be declared
as already legal, or to become legal, references to ethical authority
were traditionally allowed in the English courts, whose decisions
were such a controlling influence in shaping the common law.
To prove what actually did in the particular case correspond to
the Roman conception, acqumn et bonum, it was proper to quote
from the Scriptures, from Aristotle, and Cicero, and from the
Corpus Juris. And, although our lawyers do not at present freely
use these authorities in equity-being, we may assume for the
most part, unfamiliar with them-they are constantly citing judg-
ments of previous courts, which, in a long and unbroken series of
traditions, have been profoundly influenced by the same authori-
ties. Indeed, I have little doubt that Justice Holmes states a de-
fensible historical truth when he exhorts the students of law to
"read the great German jurists and see how much more the
world is governed to-day by Kant than by Napoleon." 4 But this
is nearly or quite the equivalent of saying that the actions of men
in the modern world, as brought under control by English and
4 Thc Path of the Lazc, Harvard Law Review, X, p. 478.
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American law, are more profoundly affected by the Kantian phil-
osophy than by the influences emanating from the Napoleonic
wars and the Napoleonic code. Kant was preeminently a teach-
er of ethics.
This same truth of the dependence of the law for its develop-
ment upon the public moral consciousness, is proved by a study of
the sources of the law. These are given by Holland as chiefly
the following: 5 Usage, religion, adjudication, scientific dis-
cussion. equity, and legislation. Each one of these sources
has its roots in the moral sentiments, judgments and practices of
the people. This is preeminently true of our law, as distinguished
from the law of lands that have a less democratic form of gov-
ernment. It is this public moral consciousness which largely de-
termines usage; and when the courts maintain that usage, how-
ever long established, must be made reasonable, they are only
appealing to this same moral consciousness for a more deliberate
and enlightened judgment. According to the most trustworthy
authorities, religion is the most important primal soure of the
prevalent moral ideas and sentiments of mankind. Adjudication
and legislation are expected to make constant reference to what
is right and wrong from the moral point of view, in order to
render the judgment commendable, the legislation just, in the
eye of moral reason. And equity, although it is sometimes, as
Selden says in his Table Talk, a "roguish thing," according to
its ver definition consists "in reality of such principles of received
morality as are applicable to legal questions, and commend them-
-selves to the functionary in question." If this particular function-
tionary in any given case does not seem really equitable in his
notions of equity, there is somehow the chance for an appeal to
the higher and wider field of what is aequum et bonmn.
There are, moreover, certain large and vague, and, therefore,
debatable conceptions, which are in themselves essentially or
chiefly ethical, but which are certain to influence the making of
laws, the decisions of the courts, and the efficient enforcmeent of
all law. Two of these have already been referred to under the
terms "law of reason" and "equity," or the conception of that
which is fair and'just. Another, even more indefinite, but scarcely
less influential in the past, is the conception covered by the term,
"the law of nature." This conception includes those rules of
living in social relations with others which are thought to be
Elements of Jurisprudence, p. 53.
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just, because they are conceived of as controlling the actions of
men in a manner dependent upon a power, not of man's willing
or choice, but a PIower-not-ourselves. Under theological influ-
ences or ecclesiastical domination, the law of nature is made the
equivalent of the law of God; for nature-so the theory runs-
is the revelation, within certain limits, of the Divine Will. To it
appeal has been taken for the commission of many crimes, ad-
judged such by the law of the land, and even for the right to up-
set, in the name of nature or of God, the existing system of law
as enforced by the sovereign authority of the state. Nevertheless,
the conception which has been so influential in our systems of
statute laws as well as of common laws, abides and will abide,
however vague at all times, and at some times injurious. But
the conception is, fundamentally considered, an ethical concep-
tion. In the same connection we may note the fact that judges
are always considered as in duty bound-a binding obligation, not
to an abstract conception called law, but to God and to the peo-
ple-to guide themselves by "justice, equity, and good con-
science," when administering the law. "I think," said Lord
Coltenham, "that it is the duty of this court to adapt its prac-
tice and course of proceedings to the existing state of society, and
not, by too strict an adherence to law, to decline to administer
justice, and to enforce rights for which there is no other remedy."
This conviction that there is something above the law, to which
the law must be subordinated and subjected, in its origin, adminis-
tration and development, explains the history of the great English
Court of Chancery. Founded to fight "obstinate oppressors of the
poor and deniers of rights," by aiming at too strict perfection of
legality it came to delay and thwart the ends of essential justice.
And then its mission was ended, its death made reasonable and
sure. Here we may also observe that considerable portions of
the law have in modern times sprung out of the judgments and
practices of certain classes, determining what seemed ethically
just and fair to them, in the solution of the problems of their
particular forms of economic and social relations. Such are the
"law merchant," the "law of nations," and many forms of the
law as equity.
It is no wonder, then, that Sir Frederick Pollock says 6 of the
law as equity, that it must combine the rational and the historical
elements; that it must have a philosophy; and that this philosophy
6 Comp. Pollock, The Expansion of the Common Law, p. i15.
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must be ethical in the larger meaning of the latter word. Nor
can we well differ from Justice Holmes -,when he affirms that our
law is the "witness and external deposit of our moral life"; and
that in general, "its history is the history of the development of
the race." For the relation between our legal system and the
moral judgments, sentiments and external conduct of the people
who live under the law is intimate, pervasive, necessary, and while
changing in form, in essential character enduring.
The establishing of this principle of the dependence of law upon
ethics raises at once in our minds-and logically so-a problem
of the most complicated character and momentous interest. The
problem is this: What and how radical must be the changes in our
law, to be recommended at once or sure to be demanded in the
near future, in order to adapt it the better to the changed moral
judgments, sentiments and practices of the people li -. rg under
the law? Three considerations, one of which has always influ-
enced the development of the legal system tinder which we are
living, and the other two of which have a special importance at the
present time, will undoubtedly combine to form the actu .1 solution
of the problem. The first of these reminds us that the develop-
ment of our law, both in England and America, has never been
anything like a strictly logical affair. It has been kept clo~e to
experience, and either amended, neglected, or broken, according
to the prevailing opinion as to its practical results. Therefore, as
says Mr, Justice Holmes, "We do not realize how large a part
of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the.
public mind." When the same authority proceeds to advocate
less regard for strict conformity to the traditions of the law, and
more regard to a rational treatment of cases in accordance with
our changed notions of the public good, he is virtually pleading
7 The Path of the Law, Har'ard Law Review, X, p. 459. Ibid., p. 466.
Elsewhere the same authority says: "The life of the law has not been
logic; it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed
or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-
men, have a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the
rules by which men should be governed." (See The Common Law, p. i,
Boston, i8gi.) About the truth of this observation there can be no
manner of doult. But while it is true in large degree of all human in-
stitutions, laws and customs deemed equitable included, it certainly is
true in pre-eminently great degree of English and American common
law. It would seem that even our legislation takes little enough account
of sound logic.
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that the popular ethics, the moral judgments and sentiments of
the body of the people, ought more thoroughly to permeate and
even to dominate the legal system of the land.
The second of these considerations concerns the part which
legislation is playing in the enactment and even in the enforcement
of the existing laws. More and more are the countless enactments
which are poured forth annually from the legislative halls of the
nation, the state, and the municipality, becoming the sources of
the developing, or at any rate of the rapidly changing, law of the
land. Where, as in some of the states, and all of the municipali-
ties, and even in the national legislative bodies, much of the law-
making is directed toward the promotion of private interests
rather than to the conservation of either the legal or the moral
order, and the social good, we have ceaseless complication, confu-
sion, and even upsetting of supposedly established principles of
justice and equity, for a by no means impossible result. I take it
that this would have to be admitted even by those who sympathize
less than some of us are inclined to do with the poet statesman,
Milton, who hesitated not to denounce much of the legislation of
his own day as "hatching lies with the heat of jurisdiction."
The third consideration is even more influential. The unprece-
dentedly rapid changes which the modern applied sciences have
brought about in the physical conditions of human life and human
intercourse, together with equally obvious or more obscure
changes in social conditions which these physical changes have
either themselves produced, or are now serving, tend to compli-
cate and make more difficult of either theoretical or practical solu-
tion, the problem which I have proposed under the theme,
"Ethics and the Law." This, added to the preceding considera-
tions, would seem to make it clear that more important and radical
changes will be demanded in the near future than have ever been
demanded before in the centuries of the development of English
and American law. Nor does there seem to be any power that
can regulate and unify these demands as did the king's judges
when, at and after the time of Edward First, the common law of
England emerged out of divergences of custom and undefined
varieties of usage, in different districts of the country, as the re-
sultant of their decisions.
It is well known that a large and growing body of the people,
under the varying shades of opinion and scheming, which are
either proclaimed or concealed by the term "Socialism," are be-
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coming profoundly dissatisfied with both the Constitution and the
administration of the law of the land. It is nt t well known,
however, and probably cannot easily be discoverd, how large a
proportion of those to whom the name of "intellectuals" has been
given in Russia share with more or less of sympathy in these
opinions; and would gladly further some of these plans. Nor
can this attitude toward the law, in my judgment, be deemed by
any means wholy unreasonable. It is certainly a fair question
whether as respects the right to acquire, hold, enjoy the usufruct
of, and to give away or bequeath property, both personal and real,
the economic, political and social conditions of modern life in this
country are not now so radically changed as to make imperative
in the near future very radical changes in the law. It is even a
fair question whether certain laws and judicial decisions respect-
ing these rights, which were originally intended and adapted to
protect the great body of the people against the powerful few,
are not now the rather adapted and employed to protect those few
against what the people are coming to feel are their rights on
moral grounds. The belief is indeed vague, difficult to define,
dangerous to cherish and enforce so far as the integrity of the
legal system is concerned; but it is not the less insistent, endur-
ing and powerful. I think that there can be no question that in
our lower courts, especially in our police courts, which come
into closest contact with the poorest and socially lowest of the
people, what our English and American ancestors conceived of as
the most fundamental of personal rights are constantly being
violated under the aegis of the law.
Further, with regard to details, it is scarcely safe for a lay-
man to go. But if he is thoughtful, patriotic and acquainted with
the main outlines of the ethical and social development of the
race, he cannot fail to take an attitude of inquiry, and of solicitous
and anxious inquiry, toward the portentious problem, with its
threatening future, which these fundamental and unchanging
relations between ethics and the law propound. England, from
which we derived our law, and which we look upon as relatively
undemocratic, and more conservative of legal precedent and
tradition, has recently gone further in some of its concessions to
these socialistic demands for quite radical changes in the exist-
ing legal status of the people, than we have as yet ventured to go.
It is to the profession of the law, far more than to any other
class of citizens, that the country must look for the practical and
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peaceful solution of this problem-if its solution is to be both prac-
tical and peaceful. For out of this profession come those inter-
preters of the Constitution, with reference to whom the late Pro-
fessor E. J. Phelps declared: 8 "It is upon the entrusting to the
judicial department of the whole subject of the constitutional law,
for all purposes, that our government rests." And if it is to rest
securely, and in freedom of development without revolution, this
body of judges must, on the one hand, judge without influence
from the directing or threatening arm of either the legislative or
the executive forces; and on the other hand, they must always
guide themselves by "justice, equity, and good conscience ;" and
I am ready to add, "by the love of the people and in the fear of
God."
From the same profession of law come the vast majority of the
judges in all the lower courts, and also of the legislative bodies,
both national and state. And here is where the best of the public
conscience can be brought to bear upon the moulding of the law
at the very beginning. Yet, as I have traveled over various parts
of the world, I have found everywhere a growing contempt and
distrust of legislative bodies. However well or ill founded, this
attitude of the public judgment is foreboding. Laws procured
otherwise than in accordance with the dictates of the prevailing
moral sentiments, and tending to produce rules of practice, en-
forced by the sovereignty of the state, Which the people of the
state do not regard as equitable and just, are the supreme dangers
of our modern system of law. Who can doubt that, if all the
lawyers of the land were of one mind and fixed moral purpose to
prevent such laws, they could in due time bring about a more
friendly relation of acceptance and cheerful obedience between
the law of the land and the better conscience of the people of the
land? For, to quote several sentences from Judge Dillon's lec-
tures on the "Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America :'"
"Law is not ethics, it is true, but except so far as laws are arbi-
trary or conventional regulations, or are mere usages or customs
not having a moral quality, * * * if there be any such, * * * they
have an ethical foundation." Again, in somewhat vague but em-
phatic language, he speaks of the law of the land as being by
"essential nature" the "enlightened, ethical, permanent justice of
the state." "Ethical considerations," he declares, "can no more
be excluded from the administration of justice, which is the end
8 Orations and Essays, p. 41 f (New York, igoi).
YALE LAW JOURNAL
and purpose of civil laws, than one can exclude the vital air from
his room and live."
In conclusion, it is not in my own name, but only in the name
and words of one of the most highly honored members of the
American bench, that I venture to express the belief that, "if the
training of lawyers led them habitually to consider more definitely
and explicitly the social advantage on which the rule they lay
down must be justified, they sometimes would hesitate, when now
they are confident, and see that really they were taking sides upon
debatable and burning questions." To this I will add by way of
interpretation, that "considering the social advantage" is the very
essential nature of that morality which controls legality, if in the
long run the essential principles of our law, as at present con-
stituted, are to remain the law of our land.
From the point of view of one who is a layman and so interested
chiefly in the moral aspects of our problem, the following con-
siderations which bear upon its solution, seem undoubtedly to be
true: First, very important and even radical changes in the ex-
isting system of laws are demanded, and will be insisted upon in
the near future by the public conscience of the body of the peo-
ple then living under the law. Second, the tendency to invade
and restrict the territory of individual rights-uniformly in the
alleged interests of the whole people, but far too often, in ways
either ignorant, if altruistic, or skillfully and designedly planned
to promote the interests of a corporation or a class-must either
reach its natural limit or else be checked by legal methods. And,
third, and above all else, these changes in legislation and in the
enforcement of the laws by the courts must secure to the minority
their rights as against the majority, and to the humblest and poor-
est individual his rights as against the richest and most powerful
corporation. Only in this way can the truest and highest social
good under the law be realized and maintained; and only thus
can the essence of our Constitution and of our hitherto existing
system of law be preserved, in the good conscience and respectful
obedience of the people of the land.
Prof. George Trumbull Ladd.
